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Questions about current and prior religion adherence from the International Social Survey Program
and the World Values Survey allow us to calculate country-level religious-conversion rates for 40
countries.  These conversion rates apply to religion adherence classified into eight major types.  In
a theoretical model based on rational individual choice, the frequency of religious conversion depends
on factors that influence the cost of switching and the cost of having the "wrong" religion.  Empirical
findings for a panel of countries accord with several hypotheses:  religious-conversion rates are positively
related to religious pluralism, gauged by adherence shares; negatively related to government restrictions
on religious conversion; positively related to levels of education; and negatively related to a history
of Communism.  Conversion rates are not much related to per capita GDP, the presence of state religion,
and the extent of religiosity.   Effects from the type of religion adherence are minor, except for a negative
effect from Muslim adherence.  The empirical results are robust to alternative specifications of the












jjhwang@post.harvard.edu  Some countries, such as the United States, Australia, South Korea, and many sub-
Saharan African countries currently have a great diversity of religion adherence.  (See 
Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [2001] for religion adherence data.)  Others, such as Spain, 
Italy, the Scandinavian countries, and many majority Muslim countries have a heavy 
concentration within a single type.  These concentrations are particularly striking if one 
ignores persons with no religion and considers only major religion categories (such as 
counting Muslim as one type).  Aside from the within-country patterns, the data show 
wide differences internationally.  Countries differ greatly in their adherence rates to the 
major world religions. 
  In the long run, the frequency distributions of religion types within and across 
countries reflect religious-conversion rates, along with cross-religion patterns of fertility, 
mortality, and migration.  This study focuses on the conversion part of this relationship.   
  Historically, religious conversion often resulted involuntarily from conquest or 
changing preferences of rulers who restricted personal religion choices.  For example, in 
central Europe, the rights of individuals to choose their own religion expanded greatly in 
1648, when the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War.  In contrast, in modern 
times, decisions to convert can usually be analyzed as an individual’s decision about 
whether and when to switch.  Conversion restrictions and other policies of governments 
and organized religions still apply in some countries, and these constraints affect personal 
choices.  However, the most important influences on the conversion decision are the 
benefits and costs as perceived by individuals.  Therefore, we use a rational-choice 
framework at the individual level to make predictions about the determinants of religious-
conversion rates at the country level.   2
  Empirical investigations of the determinants of religious conversion have 
typically focused on persons within a single country, often the United States (Stark and 
Glock [1968], Roof and McKinney [1987], Greeley [1989], Sandomirsky and Wilson 
[1990], Sherkat and Wilson [1995], Sherkat [2001], and Loveland [2003]).  Breen and 
Hayes (1996) considered the United Kingdom, and Need and de Graaf (1996) analyzed 
the Netherlands.  These studies are useful for assessing effects on the propensity to 
convert from variables such as age, gender, and race.  However, given the context of a 
single country over a relatively short time period, these analyses cannot assess the effects 
of country-wide policies and characteristics, such as regulation of the religion market, 
political regimes such as Communism, and the extent of religious pluralism at the country 
level.  Our panel of 40 countries allows us to examine in detail the effects of these kinds 
of policies and characteristics. 
  Section I discusses our procedures for using international survey data from 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP 1991 and 1998) and World Values Survey 
(WVS 2001) to estimate country averages of religious-conversion rates.  Section II 
constructs a theoretical framework based on individual choice to consider determinants of 
country-level religious-conversion rates.  Section III describes the setup of our empirical 
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I.  Survey Measures of Religious Conversion 
  The present analysis assesses the determinants of religious conversion across a 
broad sample of countries.
1  We use the waves on religion from the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) for 1991 and 1998 and the World Values Survey (WVS) around 
2001 to measure and analyze religious-conversion rates in 40 countries.  Our analysis 
focuses on country averages of conversion rates from the three surveys. 
  The underlying sample sizes for the two ISSP waves were typically between 1000 
and 2000 persons per country, though larger samples applied in a few cases.  The dating 
of the field work for the ISSP 1991 survey was in 1990 or 1991, except for 1993 for 
Australia.  The ISSP 1998 survey applied mostly to 1996 or 1997, except for 1995 for 
Slovenia and 1998 for Switzerland.  The ISSP provides good background information 
about the nature of the randomized sampling procedures used in the various country 
surveys.  The WVS 2001 wave was similar to the ISSP in sample sizes, but samples of 
fewer than 1000 persons were collected in a few cases.  The dating of the WVS surveys 
was between 1999 and 2002.  The nature of the randomized sampling procedures for the 
WVS is less well documented than for the ISSP. 
  Iannaccone (2003) used the ISSP data to assess long-term trends in church 
attendance for 32 countries.  He constructed these trends from retrospective questions 
concerning attendance rates for respondents and their parents when the respondents were 
aged 11 or 12.  Because the respondents were surveyed around 1991 and 1998 at various 
                                                 
1 One previous cross-country analysis of religious conversion is Duke, Johnson, and Duke (1993).  This 
study uses time series on religion adherence from Barrett (1982) to construct estimates of religious-
conversion rates.  The problem is that changes in the stock of adherents over time within a country reflect 
demographic factors (births, deaths, and international migration by religion type), as well as net changes 
due to religious conversion.  It is not possible to use these data to get accurate estimates of gross flows due 
to religious conversion.   4
ages 16 and over, the retrospective questions provided information on church attendance 
for varying dates in the past. 
  Inspired by the Iannaccone approach, we use different retrospective questions 
from ISSP 1991 and 1998 and WVS 2001 to calculate religious-conversion rates.  We use 
the questions that ask about a person’s current and former religion adherence.  The ISSP 
asks straightforwardly about a person’s form of religion adherence currently and when 
being raised.  The lists include an array of religion types as well as no religion.   
  The WVS questions are less well designed.  People are first asked a yes-no 
question about whether they belong currently to a religious denomination.  We use this 
question to determine the people who currently have no religion.  Then the respondents 
are asked a separate question where they are supposed to select the current religious 
denomination, if any, from a list of types.  A minor problem is that the total number 
designating a religion type in the second question does not quite correspond to the 
number saying that they belong to a religious denomination in the first question. 
  A more serious deficiency concerns former denomination.  Persons who currently 
have no religious denomination were asked whether they were ever a member of a 
religious denomination.  These answers allow us to match people who currently have no 
religion with their former status.  Persons who currently are a member of a religious 
denomination were asked whether they were ever a member of another religious 
denomination.  This question allows us to match up the current and former denomination 
for people who have two different denominations.  The difficulty is that we cannot tell 
whether persons who say “no” in the second case were previously in the same religious 
denomination or had no religious denomination.   5
  In any event, the ISSP and WVS information allows us to compute the number of 
persons whose current and former religious affiliations differ, if we consider persons with 
some religious adherence at both dates.  Note that we observe only the religion at the 
time of the survey and the former time.  Thus, from ISSP, differences between current 
and childhood religion imply that at least one religious conversion occurred between 
childhood and the current age.  For WVS, a person who indicated ever having a former 
religion must have had at least one religious conversion at some point before the current 
age.  We cannot detect multiple conversions in these data.
2 
  In addition to calculating religion changes, we computed flows from some 
religion to none and no religion to some, subject to the difficulties already noted for the 
WVS information.  However, these data pertain to overall religiousness and, therefore, to 
measures of religiosity considered in McCleary and Barro (2006) and other cross-country 
studies.  Our present empirical investigation relates not to changes in overall religiosity 
but rather to shifts of affiliation among persons professing some kind of religion 
adherence. 
  We focus on movements across major religion groups, rather than less drastic 
switches of denomination within a major type, such as between forms of mainline 
Protestantism.  To get a consistent sample from our three data sources (the two waves of 
the ISSP and the one wave of the WVS), we had to aggregate the underlying religion 
types to an eight-way classification:  Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, Eastern 
Religion (including Buddhist), Jewish, Orthodox, and Other Religion.   
                                                 
2 For the United States, the General Social Survey (GSS) religion module for 1988 asked questions about 
multiple religious conversions.  Among persons with at least one change (by the time of the survey), 67% 
indicated one change, 25% two, and 8% three or more.  These changes include movements into or out of no 
religion, as well as shifts within a major group, such as Protestantism.   6
  The main difficulty in implementing the eight-way breakdown of religions 
consistently involves the Other Religion category.  Depending on the level of detail used 
in each survey, “Other Religion” includes different sets of residual groups.  A particular 
concern is that, in some of the underlying data, Other Christian includes independent 
Christian churches, which are likely to be largely evangelical, whereas in other data, most 
independent Christian churches are subsumed in the Protestant category.  Since many 
religion transitions in recent years involve movements into independent Christian 
churches (from Protestant as well as other religions), this distinction is important for 
obtaining consistent estimates of conversion rates across data sets.  We address these 
concerns by constructing alternative measures of conversion rates based on different 
groupings of the underlying religion types.  We also consider a seven-way breakdown 
that excludes the Other Religion category entirely in the computation of conversions.  We 
find that our main results are robust to these alternative classifications. 
  The ISSP and WVS surveys indicate the current age of the respondent, where 
persons aged 16 and over were included in the surveys.  Therefore, if the current religious 
affiliation differs from the former affiliation, we know that a person currently of age A 
had a religious conversion sometime before age A.  However, we do not know exactly 
when the transition occurred. 
  Previous research and data provide some information on when in a life cycle 
religious conversion typically takes place.  Iannaccone (1990, pp. 301-302) finds that, 
among converts to Catholicism in the United States, about 85% converted before age 30.
3  
The General Social Survey (GSS) religion module for 1988 indicates that, among persons 
                                                 
3One difficulty is that the surveys include persons of various ages—converts who were young when 
surveyed could not possibly have converted when old.  In addition, the conversions include shifts from no 
religion.      7
with at least one religion change, the breakdown of ages for a person’s first change was 
76% before age 30, 15% between 30 and 39, and 9% at 40 or over.
4  Need and de Graaf 
(1996, p. 93) find for the Netherlands that most people who leave the church act before 
age 30.  However, this evidence applies to apostasy, not to conversion among types of 
religion. 
  The concentration of religious conversions at ages less than 30 is consistent with 
an important role for inter-marriage in the conversion process, as emphasized by Lehrer 
(1998) and Sherkat (2004).  According to the GSS 1988 religion module for the United 
States, the reasons given for a person’s first religion change break down into 37% 
mentioning marriage or family, 25% indicating friends or location, 18% citing issues of 
theology, and 19% giving other reasons.  Thus, inter-marriage is likely to be an important 
but not overriding element in religious conversion at least in the United States. 
  To accord with the observed patterns by age, we focus our empirical analysis on 
religious-conversion rates applicable to persons aged 30 and over at the time of each 
survey.  Thus, we concentrate on estimates of completed lifetime conversion rates; that is, 
rates that apply over the typical person’s lifetime.  However, our results are not very 
different if we look instead at the broader group of persons aged 16 and over at the 
sampling dates. 
  The total number of persons, T, surveyed in a given wave break down into those 
who, at an earlier time, adhered to various types of religions, R1, R2, …, and those 
expressing no religion adherence, N.  For illustrative purposes, suppose that there are just 
two types of religions, so that 
                                                 
4These data have the same issue of age sampling as that described in n. 3.  Also, these GSS transitions 
include movements into or out of no religion, as well as switches within a major group, such as 
Protestantism.     8
  (1)      T = R1 + R2 + N. 
  In comparing with current (survey-date) adherence, denoted by asterisks, nine 
transitions are possible:  R1→R1*, R1→R2*, R1→N*, R2→R2*, R2→R1*, R2→N*, 
N→N*, N→R1*, and N→R2*.  We view religious conversion as comprising R1→R2* 
and R2→R1*.  We look at the total of these two changes and do not distinguish between 
them.  The tables that we construct provide information on apostasy, R1→N* and 
R2→N*, and religious rebirth, N→R1* and N→R2*, but we do not study these types of 
transitions in our statistical analysis. 
 Let  ΔR be the sum of the two types of religious conversions, R1→R2* and 
R2→R1*.  Then the religious-conversion rate is the ratio of ΔR to the total number of 
persons who began with some religion adherence, R1+R2: 
 (2)   religious-conversion  rate  =  ΔR/(R1 + R2). 
In our analysis we use Eq. (2) to measure religious-conversion rates.  However, we 
consider the eight categories of religion mentioned before, rather than two.
5 
  Tables 1 and 2 describe the sample.  The statistics pertain to respondents aged 30 
and over for the countries in which the questions were asked that allow computation of 
religious-conversion rates.  Table 1 has the breakdown of current religion adherence for 
the three survey waves into the eight religion types and no religion.  The ISSP samples 
                                                 
5 We can implement Eq. (2) directly with the information given in the two ISSP waves.  For the WVS 
wave, the wording of the questions allows us to determine the number of religion switchers, ΔR, but, as 
noted before, not the breakdown of the total population between some and no religion at the earlier times.  
To estimate how the sample, T, breaks down into religiously adhering, R1+R2, and not adhering, N, at the 
earlier times, we need to know the fraction of the population with no religion adherence, N/T, during the 
various prior years.  We estimated the N/T values by using population non-religion fractions from Barrett, 
Kurian, and Johnson (2001) for 2000 and 1970.  First, we related the Barrett values for 2000 to those 
observed for the current survey date from the 2001 WVS.  The correlation was high (0.75), but the WVS 
values for N/T were systematically higher than the Barrett values, by 0.12 on average.  We therefore added 
0.12 to the Barrett N/T data for 1970 to estimate the WVS non-religion fraction for the earlier dates.  With 
these estimates, we can compute religious-conversion rates for WVS data from Eq. (2).  Since the N/T 
values are much less than one, alternative estimates for these ratios tend not to have a large impact on 
computed religious-convergence rates.   9
are dominated by Christians—Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox—but the 1998 survey 
has substantial Jewish representation. The WVS sample has relatively more Orthodox but 
still has little representation among Muslim, Hindu, and Eastern Religion.  The Other 
Religion category is around 3% of the adhering population for all three surveys.  The no-
religion percentages are high, ranging from 21% for ISSP 1998 to 30% for WVS 2001. 
  Table 2 shows matrices of religion transitions for respondents aged 30 and over 
for the aggregate of countries included in each survey.  Each row corresponds to a 
particular former religion, as shown in the left-most column.  The next nine columns 
correspond to eight current religions or to no current religion.  As an example, for ISSP 
1998, among the 13,620 persons who had Catholic as their former religion (while being 
raised), 11,663 were still Catholic at the time of the survey, 264 were Protestant, 2 were 
Muslim, 1 was Hindu, 9 had Eastern Religion (including Buddhist), 10 were Jewish, 2 
were Orthodox, 143 were in Other Religion, and 1526 had no religion adherence.   
  Table 2 also includes analogous information for ISSP 1991 and WVS 2001.  
However, as already noted (n.5), the wording of the WVS questions makes it difficult to 
fill-in all of the cells in the WVS religion-transition matrix.  The notes to the table 
describe our procedures for estimating the numbers that cannot be computed directly 
from the survey answers. 
  Our cross-country analysis focuses on the country-wide religious-conversion rates 
shown by country and survey wave for persons aged 30 and over in columns 1-3 of 
Table 3.  Among the 40 countries covered, 13 are in ISSP 1991, 29 in ISSP 1998, and 22 
in WVS 2001.  The conversion rates shown correspond to the structure of religion 
categories indicated by the transition matrices in Table 2.     10
  Because of the ambiguities mentioned before in the categories “Protestant” and 
“Other Religion,” we also computed religious-conversion rates in two alternative ways.  
The first alternative re-labels any Christian groups contained in the other-religion 
category as Protestant.  For example, for the WVS survey for Sweden, the alternative 
procedure classifies “Free Church/non-conformist/Evangelical” as Protestant, rather than 
Other Religion.  This change eliminates most of the conversions recorded for Sweden in 
the WVS 2001 survey—the religious-conversion rate falls from 0.076, shown in Table 3, 
column 3, to 0.016.  The principal other changes from the alternative method are for two 
cases in ISSP 1998:  for Norway, the conversion rate falls from 0.031 to 0.002, and for 
New Zealand, the rate falls from 0.145 to 0.096. 
  The second alternative excludes the Other Religion category entirely, thereby 
labeling as religious conversions only transitions that involve the remaining seven 
religion types.  That is, we excluded transitions that had Other Religion as the former or 
current affiliation.  (In this alternative classification, we retained the Protestant category 
as defined in the original specification.)  This second approach likely goes much too far 
in limiting changes recorded as conversions.  As can be seen from Table 2, the total 
number of conversions falls from 1788 to 854—that is, 52% of the conversions are 
eliminated.  In terms of conversion rates, the mean falls from 0.045 to 0.024 for ISSP 
1991, from 0.050 to 0.024 for ISSP 1998, and from 0.023 to 0.009 for WVS 2001. 
Despite the large changes in levels of conversion rates, the patterns of religious 
conversion across countries remain similar—the correlation of the log of the revised 
conversion rates (with Other Religion excluded) with the original ones is 0.93 for ISSP 
1991, 0.71 for ISSP 1998, and 0.62 for WVS 2001.   11
  For the data in Table 3, the correlations of the logs of religious-conversion rates 
among countries sampled more than once are 0.81 between ISSP 1991 and ISSP 1998 
(12 countries) and 0.63 between ISSP 1998 and WVS 2001 (also 12 countries).  For ISSP 
1991 and WVS 2001, the correlation is 0.96, but only 5 countries appear in both surveys.  
We have concerns about the reliability of the WVS information on religious conversion, 
partly because of shortcomings in the questions related to religion adherence (see n. 5 and 
notes to Table 2) and, more generally, because of ambiguities in the sampling procedures 
employed by the WVS.   
  For the 12 countries represented in ISSP 1998 and WVS 2001, the average 
conversion rates are 0.034 from ISSP 1998 and 0.022 from WVS 2001, with respective 
standard deviations of 0.033 and 0.022.  Since we view the ISSP surveys as more 
accurate, we think that the WVS 2001 data systematically understate the extent and 
variability of conversion rates.  Despite the problems with the WVS data, we are reluctant 
to drop these observations, because we think they provide incremental information.  To 
retain all the data while addressing concerns about varying data quality across the 
surveys, we allow in the regression analysis for differences in intercepts and error-term 
variances for observations from the different survey waves. 
  The average religious-conversion rates, shown in Table 3, are 0.045 for ISSP 
1991 (N=13), 0.050 for ISSP 1998 (N=29), and 0.023 for WVS 2001 (N=22).  There is a 
substantial range of conversion rates across countries, as indicated by the respective 
standard deviations of 0.033, 0.050, and 0.019. The countries with conversion rates above 
10% are Canada (17% in ISSP 1998), the United States (16% in ISSP 1998 and 12% in 
ISSP 1991), New Zealand (14% in ISSP 1998), and Chile (13% in ISSP 1998).  Those   12
with conversion rates below 1% are Finland (0.2% in WVS), Romania (0.2% in WVS), 
Slovenia (0.3% in WVS, 0.6% in ISSP 1991, 0.7% in ISSP 1998), Bulgaria (0.2% in 
WVS and 0.4% in ISSP 1998), Spain (0.4% in ISSP 1998 and 0.6% in WVS), Italy (0.5% 
in WVS and 0.6% in ISSP 1991), Hungary (0.5% in ISSP 1991), Slovak Republic (0.6% 
in ISSP 1998), Cyprus (0.7% in ISSP 1998), and Poland (0.8% in ISSP 1998). 
 
II.  Theoretical Framework 
  This section works out a simple theoretical model to provide a framework for the 
subsequent empirical analysis.  We focus on hypotheses about the determinants of 
religious-conversion rates at the country level. 
  Suppose that m religion types exist in a country.  If the religions can be ordered 
by a single characteristic, such as strictness, we can array the types zi along a line at 
positions z1, …, zm, where one of these types can represent no religion.  Differences 
between religion types are then represented by horizontal distances.  Alternatively, the 
types could be arranged around a circle.  In this case, the arc-distances measure 
differences between religions, but there is no sense in which any particular religion 
exhibits the lowest or highest amount of something like strictness.  (We could also 
generalize to multiple religion characteristics.) 
  Individual j is “born” (corresponding, perhaps, to the end of dependent childhood 
at age 16) with religion adherence of type xj.  This type corresponds to one of the zi.  Let 
(xj)* represent person j’s ideal type of religion at a point in time.  Because religion 
preferences are shaped by family and neighborhood upbringing, xj will typically be close 
to (xj)* at the time of “birth.”  However, religion preferences, (xj)*, can change over time.    13
We assume that they evolve randomly, following a process with positive variance but no 
systematic trend.  The variance of the random process is important for determining the 
frequency of religious conversion, but we assume in applications of the model that this 
variance is the same across time and place.  Given this variance, the optimally determined 
frequency of religion switching will depend on two factors:  the cost of switching and the 
cost of having xj deviate from (xj)*.  A higher switching cost results in a lower frequency 
of conversion, whereas a larger cost of deviation results in a higher frequency of 
conversion. 
  In the simplest setting, the cost of changing religion for person j is the lump-sum 
amount γj, independently of which religion pairs enter into the change.  More 
realistically, this cost would depend on which pair of religions applies.  For example, 
switches to neighboring religions will typically be less costly than movements to faraway 
religions.  Moreover, some religions may have higher or lower costs of entering or 
leaving.  In any case, the cost γj depends on individual and country-wide variables.  At 
the individual level, one determinant of γj is education.  More educated people likely find 
it easier to change religions because they are better at learning and adjusting to new ways 
of thinking.  The better educated likely also have more information about alternative 
religions and more contact with people of other religions.  At the country level, the 
switching cost depends on government regulations; for example, legal or religious 
restrictions on conversion raise γj for all persons j within the affected country. 
  The cost of having xj deviate from (xj)* depends on the location of other available 
religions.  For example, if xj is a given distance from (xj)*, the benefit from switching 
will be greater the closer an alternative religion, one of the zi, to (xj)*.  The suitability of   14
alternative religions to the preferences of the typical individual tends to be greater the 
higher the density of the available religions in a country.  The idea, as in Gruber (2005), 
is that the greater the concentration of the nearby population in a particular religion, the 
smaller the costs for each member to participate in that religion.  Thus, the more 
pluralistic a country’s religion market, the higher the typical benefit from making a 
switch—or, equivalently, the higher the cost of allowing one’s current religion, xj, to 
deviate from (xj)*. 
  The available religions in a country need not be fixed over time.  For example, the 
rise of Evangelicalism in many places made it less costly for persons to belong to that 
faith.  In the model, we could represent this change by introducing at some point in time a 
shift to a more pluralistic religion market.  This kind of change would induce a large 
amount of religious conversion as a temporary response to the market innovation.  
Formally, we would predict that religious conversion would depend not only on the 
current level of religious pluralism (a steady-state effect) but also on past changes in the 
extent of this pluralism. 
  The cost of deviation from one’s ideal religion type depends on how important 
formal religion is overall.  That is, for given locations of available religions, the cost of a 
deviation of xj from (xj)* will be greater the more important formal religion is to people.  
For example, our sample of 40 countries includes 14 that were formerly Communist (but 
none that were Communist at the time of the surveys).  Communist governments sought 
to diminish the overall value attached to religious participation and beliefs (see, for 
example, Froese and Pfaff [2001]).  To the extent that this political influence remains 
effective after the demise of Communism, the value of religion would be smaller and the   15
cost of deviations of xj from (xj)* would be lower.  In contrast, education has been argued 
to raise the benefits of religion through its networking role (Sacerdote and Glaeser 
[2001]).  This effect implies that more education would raise the cost of a given deviation 
of xj from (xj)*.   
  The secularization hypothesis argues that higher per capita income, which we 
gauge at the country level by real per capita GDP, lowers the demand for religion, 
measured by participation in formal services and religious beliefs.  (See McCleary and 
Barro [2006] for an overview and cross-country empirical evidence.)  From this 
perspective, higher per capita income would reduce the cost of a given deviation of xj 
from (xj)*.  However, although the evidence suggests that higher per capita income 
lowers religious participation and beliefs, an increase in per capita income need not 
reduce amounts spent per person on religion, and this spending variable is the relevant 
measure of the value placed on formal religion.  Therefore, the predicted impact of per 
capita GDP on the cost of a given deviation of xj from (xj)* is ambiguous. 
  Our theoretical framework is analogous to (S,s) models of inventory 
accumulation, as applied previously in many contexts.  An individual who optimizes 
religion choices would allow (xj)* to evolve to some extent away from xj.  However, a 
sufficient deviation—that is, the attainment of a critical gap—triggers the payment of the 
lump-sum adjustment cost, γj, and the choice of a new religion, xj, that is closer than the 
former one to the current (xj)*.  The frequency of these changes in a country’s overall 
population will be greater the lower the typical γj and the higher the typical cost of 
deviations of xj from (xj)*.  In our empirical analysis, we gauge the frequency of religion 
change by the fraction of the adhering population that undergoes a religious conversion   16
by age 30.  Given the previous discussion, the model predicts that this conversion rate 
will be higher if:
6 
•  a country has a higher level of religious pluralism, 
•  a country shifted recently toward greater religious pluralism, 
•  a country lacks religious and legal restrictions on conversion, 
•  a country lacks a history of Communism, 
•  a country has higher average educational attainment. 
Higher per capita GDP has an ambiguous effect on the frequency of religious conversion. 
  We can augment the basic model to allow for inter-marriage.  Marriage to a 
partner of a different religion tends to generate a jump in ideal religion type, (xj)*, at the 
time of marriage.  That is, a spouse’s strong incentive to match the partner’s religion 
generates a lot of religious conversion around the time of inter-marriage.  A deeper 
analysis would treat inter-marriage as endogenous, along the lines of Lehrer (1998), 
taking account of the costs of having different religions and of making shifts in religion 
adherence.  For present purposes, an important point is that the incorporation of inter-
marriage leaves intact the predictions worked out before for the determinants of the 
frequency of religious conversion. 
 
 
                                                 
6 An increase in the variance of the religion-preference shock raises the frequency of conversion for a given 
setting of the critical gap.  However, a higher variance also motivates people to increase the size of the 
critical gap.  This last response reduces the frequency of conversion.  Typically, this second effect will only 
partially offset the first effect; that is, a higher variance of preferences results, on net, in a higher frequency 
of conversion.  For a derivation in an analogous context (the frequency of price change when these changes 
entail lump-sum adjustment costs), see Barro (1972, Eq. [22]).  This finding would add additional 
hypotheses to our list if we could identify variables that influence the variance of the religion-preference 
shock.  However, we have not made progress in this direction.   17
III.  Setup of the Empirical Analysis 
  We use a regression system with three equations.  The dependent variables are the 
logs of religious-conversion rates computed from ISSP 1991, ISSP 1998, and WVS 2001, 
as shown in Table 3.
7  Estimates are by the seemingly-unrelated technique, which allows 
the error variances to differ for the three samples and for the residuals to be correlated 
across survey waves for a given country.  Each equation also has its own intercept, 
thereby allowing for differences across surveys in measured levels of conversion rates.  
Aside from the different intercepts, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are 
constrained to be the same across the three survey waves. 
  Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for the variables used in the 
regression systems.  The first three columns apply to the regression samples, which are 
dictated mainly by the availability of the religious-conversion data.  For comparison, the 
last three columns give means and standard deviations for much broader samples of 
countries.  All means apply to unweighted samples; that is, each country receives the 
same weight irrespective of population, GDP, and so on. 
  The independent variables correspond to the hypotheses from the framework 
described before.  The religious-pluralism variable is based on a breakdown of religion 
adherence for 1970 from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001); henceforth, referred to as 
Barrett.  We use an eight-way breakdown of religion types, corresponding to the one we 
                                                 
7 The log form appropriately restricts the conversion rate to non-negative values.  (No zero values occur in 
our main sample but do arise in several cases when we exclude Other Religion in the calculation of 
conversion rates.  For the regressions with this alternative religious-conversion rate, we used the log of the 
conversion rate plus 0.001.)  We could use a logistic form, log[x/(1-x)], where x is the conversion rate, to 
restrict the conversion rate not to exceed one.  However, since all observed values of x are much less than 
one, the logistic form is nearly the same as the simpler log form that we use.   18
used for the ISSP and WVS surveys.
8   Barrett also provides information on the fraction 
of the population having no religion adherence. 
  The form of the pluralism variable is suggested by a religion-matching model, 
specifically a model of marriage between persons with differing religions.  The variable 
corresponds to the probability that a randomly selected person with some religion 
adherence will, in a random encounter, meet a person with some, but differing, religion 
adherence.  The first concept that we employ is one minus the usual Herfindahl index of 
religion shares among persons with some religion adherence.  This Herfindahl measure—
the sum of the squares of the religion-adherence shares—is appropriate if we think of 
persons with some religion randomly encountering other persons with some, but not 
necessarily the same, religion. 
  We also consider an alternative pluralism measure that takes account of persons 
with no religion.  This measure applies if people with some religion randomly encounter 
other persons with some religion (either the same or different) or no religion.  This 
measure depends partly on the composition of the adhering population across religions 
and partly on the fraction of persons with no religion.  Given the distribution across 
religion types, the second variable is smaller than the first if the share of the population 
with no religion is positive.
9 
  If we take account of assortative mating—persons of the same religion being 
more likely to match with each other—the probability of a religion mismatch could be 
                                                 
8 Some previous uses of the Barrett adherence data, such as McCleary and Barro (2006), included the 
category “other Christian,” which combines the Barrett categories of independent Christian churches, 
unaffiliated Christians, and “marginal Christians.”  To approximate the ISSP-WVS eight-way scheme, we 
merged this other Christian category with Protestant and Anglican in the Barrett numbers. 
9 Let H be the Herfindahl index of religion concentration among persons with some religion adherence—
that is, the sum of the squares of the religion population shares in the adhering population.  Let n be the 
ratio of persons with no religion to the total adhering population.  Then the alternative pluralism variable is 
given by (1-H)/(1+n), which is declining with H and n.   19
substantially smaller than the number given by either of the religious-pluralism variables.  
However, the mismatch probability would still tend to be increasing with the pluralism 
variables that we use.  The religious-conversion rate would, in turn, be increasing in the 
mismatch probability and, hence, with the pluralism variables.  Although we motivated 
this linkage from inter-marriage, we would get the same result for other reasons.  That is, 
aside from marriage considerations, a greater variety of religions available in a country 
would raise the rate of religious conversion—by making it less costly for persons to 
switch to alternative religions. 
  The theory suggests that religious conversion depends on past changes in 
religious pluralism, as well as the current level of pluralism.  Based on the data from 
Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001), we calculated the pluralism values for 1900, 1970, 
and 2000.  Unfortunately, we lack information between 1900 and 1970.  We can compute 
the change in pluralism between 1900 and 1970 but this change likely gives little 
information about the dynamics of pluralism that matter for our religious-conversion 
data—which pertain to conversions not too much prior to the survey dates around 1991, 
1998, and 2001.  We can also compute from the Barrett data changes in religious 
pluralism between 1970 and 2000 (or between 1970 and 1990), but these changes cannot 
be satisfactorily regarded as exogenous with respect to the religious-conversion rates that 
we calculated.  Therefore, at this stage, we are not optimistic about our ability to isolate 
effects from past changes in religious pluralism on the observed conversion rates. 
  The dummy variable for legal restrictions on religious conversion comes from the 
Religion & State Data Set compiled by Fox and Sandler (2008).  We use the information 
for 1990, the first year of their data, or for the earliest date available.  Since their data   20
show strong persistence over time in these kinds of legal restrictions, the precise date is 
not critical.   
  Fox and Sandler provide four relevant indicators for legal restrictions that relate to 
religious conversion:  those applying to conversion into minority religions, conversion 
out of the majority religion, proselytizing, and inter-faith marriage.  However, none of the 
40 countries in our religious-conversion sample have legal restrictions of the first two 
types.  These direct restrictions on conversion tend to exist in predominantly Muslim 
countries.
10  Although the WVS 2001 wave contains many predominantly Muslim 
countries, the questions that allow calculation of the religious-conversion rate were not 
asked in any of these countries.  We think this omission applies because residents of these 
countries would likely view a question about having a different religion earlier in life as 
insulting, especially when it pertains to an activity that is unlawful, as well as sinful.  For 
the present analysis, we define our restrictions variable as a dummy that takes on the 
value one if the country had in place in 1990 (or a nearby date) restrictions on 
proselytizing or inter-faith marriage.  (See Table 3 for the data.) 
  Real per capita GDP in 1990 is the value in 2000 U.S. dollars from version 6.2 of 
the Penn-World Tables (available online).
11  These data feature purchasing-power 
adjustments to compare standards of living across countries.  Average years of school 
attainment in 1990 for the adult population aged 25 and over come from Barro and Lee 
(2001).
12  The dummy variables for Communist regime in 1970, having a state religion in 
1970, and having government regulation of the religion market in the 1970s come from 
                                                 
10 Among 39 countries with Muslim adherence of at least 50%, 25 have conversion restrictions either out of 
the majority religion or into a minority religion.  18 have both types of restrictions. 
11 For Bulgaria and Lithuania, 1990 data were unavailable, and we used the values for 1995. 
12 For Croatia, we used the 1990 value for the former Yugoslavia.  For Belarus and Ukraine, we used the 
1990 value for Russia (which we took as representative of the former Soviet Union).   21
Barro and McCleary (2005).  The regulation variable, an extension of Chaves and Cann 
(1992), was based on whether the government appointed or approved religious leaders.  
The results in McCleary and Barro (2006) showed that religious participation and beliefs 
were deterred by current and former Communism, encouraged by the presence of state 
religion (interpreted as a subsidy effect), and discouraged by government regulation of 
the religion market. 
  Data on monthly attendance at formal religious services, holding various religious 
beliefs, and self-classifying as a religious person come from the survey information given 
in various waves of the WVS, ISSP, and the Gallup Millennium Survey.  These data are 
discussed in McCleary and Barro (2006).  We use here the values from the 1990 WVS if 
these are available.  Then we fill in, as available, numbers (adjusted for differences in 
average levels across surveys) from WVS 1981, ISSP 1991, WVS 1995, ISSP 1998, 
Gallup, and WVS 2001. 
  Table 4 makes clear some of the selection issues related to the availability of the 
religious-conversion data.  The regression sample for religious conversion comprises 
countries that are substantially richer and more educated than the broad sample of 
countries.  The regression sample is over-weighted toward former Communist countries.  
In terms of religion adherence, the regression sample is slanted toward Catholic, 
Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish, and away from Muslim, Hindu, Eastern Religion 
(including Buddhist), and Other Religion.  The regression sample also has over-
representation of persons with no religion. 
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IV.  Empirical Findings 
  Table 5, column 1 shows a baseline regression system for logs of religious-
conversion rates from the three survey waves.  Each of the three equations includes its 
own intercept.  However, the estimated intercepts turn out not to differ significantly from 
each other (p-value = 0.24).  The last two lines of the table show the fits of each equation, 
gauged by R-squared values and standard errors of estimation.  The fits for the ISSP 
waves are similar, with R-squared values in excess of 0.7.  That for the WVS wave is 
only 0.24; we think, again, because of the relatively poor quality of the data.  Similarly, 
the standard error for the WVS equation is much higher than those for the ISSP 
equations. 
  As expected, the religious-pluralism variable for 1970 (calculated from adherence 
shares among the adhering population) has a significantly positive impact on the log of 
the conversion rate; the coefficient in Table 5, column 1 is 2.9 (s.e. = 0.5).  This 
coefficient means that a one-standard-deviation increase in the religious-pluralism 
variable (by 0.19 in Table 4) raises the estimated log of the religious-convergence rate by 
0.55.  That is, at the sample mean conversion rate of 0.050 (for ISSP 1998), the estimated 
convergence rate would rise by about 70% to 0.087.  Looking at Table 3, column 4, we 
see that low degrees of religious pluralism can explain why religious-conversion rates are 
particularly low in Spain, Finland, Italy, Poland, and Slovenia.  In contrast, the high 
values of the pluralism variable in Canada and the United States help to explain high 
conversion rates. 
  If we add the change in the religious-pluralism variable from 1900 to 1970 to the 
regression system, this new variable has an estimated coefficient near zero.  We think this   23
result applies because the measured change in pluralism is too far in the past to matter for 
our measured religious-conversion rates.  Thus, at present, our results pertain to the long-
term relation between the structure of religion adherence and religious-convergence rates, 
not to effects from changes in the adherence structure. 
  As expected, legal restrictions that deter religious conversion (involving 
proselytizing and inter-faith marriage) have a significantly negative effect on the log of 
the conversion rate, with a coefficient in Table 5, column 1 of -0.84 (s.e. = 0.21).  The 
estimated coefficient implies that the implementation of a legal restriction (moving the 
dummy variable from zero to one) reduces the estimated conversion rate by nearly 
60%—from 0.05 to 0.02 at the sample mean for ISSP 1998.  The conversion restrictions 
that we recorded apply to 25% of the regression sample (see Tables 3 and 4).  As noted 
before, the sample includes no predominantly Muslim countries, many of which have 
legal restrictions on religious conversion. 
  Religious conversion is significantly negatively related to former Communism, 
with a coefficient in Table 5, column 1 of -1.52 (s.e. = 0.20).  Thus, the estimated effect 
is even larger in magnitude than that from conversion restrictions.  The regression sample 
has 35% of the observations as former Communist (Table 4).  Previous findings 
(McCleary and Barro [2006]) indicated that the influence of past Communism on 
religious participation and belief decayed over time but continued to be significantly 
negative after 10-15 years.  (See also Inglehart and Baker [2000].)  Our interpretation is 
that past Communism has a depressing influence on the value attached currently to 
formal religion and, thereby, diminishes the propensity for religious conversion.   24
  The log of per capita GDP in 1990 has a negative but small and statistically 
insignificant effect on religious-conversion rates.  The estimated coefficient in Table 5, 
column 1 is -0.09 (s.e. = 0.19).  This result accords with the ambiguous effect noted 
before for the effect of higher per capita income on the value attached to formal religion. 
  In contrast, the variable for average years of school attainment of the adult 
population in 1990 has a significantly positive effect on religious-conversion rates, with a 
coefficient of 0.21 (s.e. = 0.05).
13  This coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in educational attainment (by 1.6 years in the regression sample, see Table 4) 
raises the estimated religious-conversion rate by about 40% (from 0.05 to 0.07 at the 
sample mean for ISSP 1998).  Our interpretation of the education effect from the 
perspective of the theoretical framework is that more education reduces the cost of 
religious conversion and raises the benefit from formal religion—thereby, raising the 
propensity to convert on both counts. 
  Although per capita GDP and education are highly positively correlated, the 
results show that the sample has sufficient independent movement in these variables to 
distinguish the effects.  The estimated positive impact of education on a country’s 
religious-conversion rate accords with Loveland (2003, Table 2), who found a 
significantly positive effect from years of education on the probability of switching 
religions in U.S. data from the 1988 GSS religion module.  As a related matter, Lehrer 
(1998, p. 255) and Sherkat (2004, p. 618) report positive effects of education on 
individual probabilities of inter-marriage in the United States. 
                                                 
13 If we break down total years of schooling into primary, secondary, and higher, the estimated coefficients 
in the system for religious-conversion rates are 0.19 (s.e. = 0.08) on primary, 0.23 (0.12) on secondary, and 
0.28 (0.39) on higher.  These results accord with the hypothesis that only total years of schooling matter 
(p-value = 0.92).   25
  The results are not very different if we use the alternative definition of religious 
pluralism—the one discussed before that brings in an effect from the no-religion 
population.  These results are in Table 6, column 1.  The pattern of coefficient estimates 
is similar to that in Table 5, column 1, but the fits are somewhat poorer.  We focus, 
henceforth, on the findings with the initial form of the pluralism variable. 
  Table 5, column 2 adds to the regression system two dummy variables concerning 
institutional aspects of religion—the presence of a state religion in 1970 and the presence 
of government regulation of religion in the 1970s.  Although these variables were 
important in an earlier study for explaining religious participation and beliefs (McCleary 
and Barro [2006]), the two variables are individually and jointly statistically insignificant 
in the system for religious conversion (p-value = 0.20 for joint significance).  This result 
makes sense because the system already includes a more directly relevant institutional 
measure, the presence of legal restrictions related to conversion. 
  We next added measures of religious participation and beliefs (applying typically 
around 1990).  Conceptually, the effects of these variables on religious conversion are 
ambiguous.  Greater participation and belief signify that formal religion is more 
important to a person, thereby suggesting a higher frequency of religious conversion.  
However, greater participation and belief also indicate a higher degree of satisfaction 
with and attachment to a person’s incumbent religion and, thereby, predict a lower 
frequency of religious conversion.  In any event, the estimated coefficients were 
insignificant when we used the extent of monthly or more attendance at formal religious 
services along with the extent of belief in hell, heaven, or an after-life, or whether people 
viewed themselves as religious.  (Some of these variables were statistically significant for   26
explaining economic growth in Barro and McCleary [2003].)  A representative finding 
appears in Table 5, column 3, which includes monthly attendance along with the extent of 
religiousness.  The p-value for joint significance of these two variables is 0.70. 
  We also consider whether religious-conversion rates bear some relation to the 
composition of religion adherence (in 1970).  Effects might arise here if religions differed 
by costs of joining or leaving or if religions differed by the degree of attachment of their 
members.  Among the religion categories shown in Table 4, the only one that has 
significant explanatory power for religious-conversion rates is the fraction of the 
adhering population Muslim.  Table 5, column 4 shows a marginally significant negative 
effect from the Muslim adherence share.  The inclusion of this variable has little impact 
on the other results, except that the coefficient on the conversion-restriction variable 
becomes smaller in magnitude (but remains significant). 
  Table 6, columns 2 and 3, assesses the robustness of the results to alternative 
definitions of religious conversion.  As noted before, we use alternative approaches 
concerning the treatments of the categories “Protestant” and “Other Religion” in the 
computation of religious-conversion rates.   
  Table 6, column 2 corresponds to the first alternative definition, in which all other 
Christian types are classified as Protestant, rather than Other Religion.  The overall 
pattern of coefficient estimates is similar to that in the original specification (Table 5, 
column 1).  The main change is the reduction in the coefficient for school attainment.  
The fits are also notably poorer than those in the initial specification.  Thus, our 
preference is for the original specification, but the main inferences are robust to this 
alternative definition of conversion.   27
  Table 6, column 3 corresponds to the second alternative definition, which 
eliminates all conversions associated with “Other Religion.”  As noted before, this 
alternative roughly halves the religious-conversion rates, but the estimated rates remain 
substantially correlated with the original values.  The regression coefficients show more 
differences from the original form (Table 5, column 1), but religious pluralism and school 
attainment remain significantly positive and Communism remains significantly negative.  
Two differences are that the conversion-restrictions variable is no longer statistically 
significant, whereas the log of per capita GDP becomes significantly negative at the 5% 
level.  The fits of the equations—particularly for the ISSP waves—are notably poorer 
than those for the original specification.  Thus, we prefer the original specification but 
nevertheless find it informative that the overall pattern of empirical estimates is robust to 
this drastic change in definition of religious conversion. 
 
V.  Summary observations 
  We used retrospective questions about religion adherence from three international 
survey waves to construct country averages of religious-conversion rates.  Our concept of 
conversion considers only shifts across major religion types, using a breakdown of 
religions into eight broad groups.  The conversion rates for the population aged 30 and 
over vary substantially across countries, ranging from near zero for Spain, Italy, and 
many former Communist countries in Eastern Europe to over 10% in the United States, 
Canada, Chile, and New Zealand.  Although our analysis focuses on switches among 
types of religions, the data also cover movements from religion to no religion and vice 
versa.   28
  In a theoretical model, the frequency of religious conversion depends on factors 
that influence the cost of switching and the cost of having the “wrong” religion.  These 
theoretical concepts suggested explanatory variables to use in our empirical analysis of 
country-level religious-conversion rates.  We report several empirical findings that 
accord with the underlying theory:  the religious-conversion rate is positively related to 
the extent of religious pluralism, gauged by the composition of adherence shares; 
negatively related to government restrictions that inhibit religious conversion; positively 
related to levels of education; and negatively related to a history of Communism.  Given 
these variables, conversion rates were not much related to per capita GDP, the presence 
of state religion, and the extent of religiosity.  The composition of religion adherence was 
mostly unimportant, except for a small negative effect from the Muslim adherence share.  
The empirical results were robust to alternative specifications of the religious-pluralism 
variable and to changes in the religion groupings used to construct the conversion rates. 
  In planning extensions of this research, we start with our view of religious 
conversion as one dimension of the fluidity of the religion market.  Opportunities for 
conversion affect the degree of religious pluralism and the extent of competition among 
religion providers.  Through these channels, religious-conversion rates should influence 
levels of religiosity, along the lines analyzed in McCleary and Barro (2006).  In carrying 
out this extension, we will also use our data on switches between religion and no religion, 
as well as the movements between religions that we studied in this paper. 
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Table 1 
Current Religion Adherence in Religious-Conversion Sample (ages 30 and over) 
  ISSP 1991  ISSP 1998  WVS 2001 
Religion 
  










Catholic  5716  47.5 11958 52.1  9192  54.3 
Protestant  5198 43.2 6700 29.2 2998 17.7 
Muslim  58  0.5 222 1.0 205 1.2 
Hindu  10 0.1 11 0.0  6  0.0 
Eastern  6  0.1 393 1.7  8  0.0 
Jewish  36  0.3 755 3.3  29  0.2 
Orthodox  699  5.8 2191 9.5 3936  23.3 
Other  310 2.6 720 3.1 544 3.2 
Total adhering  12033 100.0 22950 100.0 16918 100.0 
No religion  4156 -- 6130 --  7310*  -- 
Total pop.  16189 -- 29080 -- 24228 -- 
No religion %  -- 25.7 -- 21.1 -- 30.2 
 
 
Notes:  ISSP is International Social Survey Program (1991 covers 1990-1993, 1998 
covers 1998-2000).  WVS 2001 is World Values Survey (covering 1999-2003).  Eastern 
Religion has Buddhist and other eastern religions.  Adhering percentages are relative to 
the adhering population.  No religion percent is relative to the total population. 
 
*WVS 2001 has 24,390 respondents aged 30 and over, of which 7359 indicated no 
religion adherence and 17,031 indicated some religion adherence.  In a separate question, 
only 16,918 persons (less than the 17,031) responded when asked which particular 
religion they adhered to.  The number 7359 was scaled downward accordingly to 7310 in 
order to maintain the ratio of no to some religion indicated by the first question.  This 
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Table 2  Matrices of Religious Conversions, aged 30 and over, all countries 
Former religion  Current religion   
  Catholic Protestant Muslim Hindu Eastern Jewish  Orthodox  Other  None   Total Former 
ISSP 1991 
Catholic  5560 116  0 0  2  0  0  33  568 6279 
Protestant  121 4941  2 0  0  3  1 127  1307  6502 
Muslim  0 1  45  0  0  0  0  0  1  47 
Hindu  0 0 0  10  0  0  0  1  0  11 
Eastern  1 2 0  0  4  0  0  0  4  11 
Jewish  0 0 6  0  0  32  0  0  8  46 
Orthodox  2 1 0  0  0  0  269  10  37  319 
Other  7 47 1  0  0  0  1  120  53  229 
None  25 90 4  0  0  1  428  19  2178  2745 
Total Current  5716 5198  58 10  6  36  699 310  4156  16189 
                  
ISSP 1998 
Catholic  11663 264  2  1  9  10  2  143  1526  13620 
Protestant  117 6091  5 1  2  5  8 235  1311  7775 
Muslim  2 0  205  0  0  0  5  1  10  223 
Hindu  0 0 0  5  0  0  0  0  4 9 
Eastern  0 0 0  0  312  0  0  5  37  354 
Jewish  6 3 1  0  0  701  1  0  9  721 
Orthodox  11 3 0  0  0  3  1556  17  65  1655 
Other  22 58 0  4  10  4 0  209  124  431 
None  137 281  9 0  60  32  619  110  3044  4292 
Total Current  11958 6700  222 11 393  755 2191 720  6130 29080 
   34
 
Table 2, continued 
Former religion  Current religion   
  Catholic Protestant Muslim Hindu Eastern Jewish Orthodox Other None Total  Former 
WVS 2001 
Catholic  8131* 41  2 1  0  1  20 69  1292  9557* 
Protestant  32 2585* 0 0  1  0  5  43  598  3264* 
Muslim  1 0  180*  0  0  0  0  0  7  188* 
Hindu  0 1 0  4*  0  0  0  0  1  6* 
Eastern  1 0 0  0  6*  0  1  0  0  8* 
Jewish  0 0 0  0  0  23*  3  0  3  29* 
Orthodox  13 10 1  0  0  1  3480*  15  66  3586* 
Other  28 47 0  0  0  1 5  367*  75  523* 
None  986* 314* 22*  1* 1* 3* 422*  50*  5128  7066* 




Notes:  Cells show numbers of each type of religion transition for persons currently aged 30 and over in the aggregate of the sampled 
countries for each of three survey waves:  International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1991 and 1998 and World Values Survey 
(WVS) 2001.  The rows have former religions, as indicated in the left-most column, and the next nine columns show current religions.  
The breakdown is for eight religion groups plus no religion.  The diagonals show numbers of persons who remained in their initial 
category.  The text discusses why the questions in the WVS wave do not allow us to ascertain directly whether a person with a current 
religious affiliation had formerly the same or no religious affiliation.  The affected cells are the ones indicated by asterisks.  The text, 
n.5, describes how we estimated the total number of persons with no former religious affiliation (7066 in the right-most column).  To 
approximate the remaining cells, we made a number of assumptions.  To illustrate, for the Catholic column, we know from WVS the 
sum of the rows corresponding to formerly Catholic plus formerly none (9117 = 8131 + 986).  Our key assumption is that the ratio of 
those coming from none (estimated at 986) to the known total (9117) is the same for Catholic as it is for each other current religion 
(column for Protestant, etc.).  These assumptions, together with our procedure for estimating the total former number for none (7066), 
allow us to fill in all the cells.  35
 
Table 3  Religious-Conversion Rates and other Variables 


















  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Australia  0.054 --  --  0.43  0.41  0  0 
Austria  0.034 0.019 0.020  0.17  0.16  0  0 
Belgium  -- --  0.043 0.09  0.09  0  0 
Bulgaria  -- 0.004  0.002  0.28  0.21  1  1 
Belarus  -- --  0.020 0.29  0.17  1  1 
Canada  -- 0.171 --  0.53  0.52  0  0 
Switzerland  -- 0.055 --  0.52  0.52  1  0 
Chile  -- 0.130 --  0.31  0.30  0  0 
Cyprus  -- 0.007 --  0.40  0.39  1  0 
Czech Republic  -- 0.024  0.013  0.40  0.33  0  1 
Denmark  -- 0.019 --  0.03  0.03  0  0 
Spain  -- 0.004  0.006  0.02  0.02  0  0 
Estonia  -- --  0.024 0.53  0.25  0  1 
Finland  -- --  0.005 0.03  0.03  1  0 
France  -- 0.018  0.020  0.14  0.13  1  0 
Germany (west)  0.031 0.044  --  0.52  0.51  1  0 
U.K. (Britain)  0.070 0.089  --  0.26  0.24  0  0 
Greece  -- --  0.038 0.11  0.11  1  0 
Croatia  -- --  0.010 0.22  0.21  0  1 
Hungary  0.005 0.026  --  0.44  0.38  0  1 
Ireland  -- 0.019 --  0.17  0.17  0  0 
Iceland  -- --  0.039 0.02  0.02  0  0 
Israel  -- 0.017 --  0.25  0.25  1  0 
Italy  0.006 0.027 0.005  0.08  0.07  0  0 
Japan  -- 0.021 --  0.07  0.06  0  0 
Lithuania  -- --  0.018 0.14  0.10  1  1 
Latvia  -- 0.084  0.039  0.67  0.35  0  1 
Netherlands  0.077 0.092 0.044  0.51  0.46  0  0 
Norway  0.032 0.031  --  0.00  0.00  0  0 
New Zealand  0.070 0.145  --  0.29  0.28  0  0 
Philippines  0.040 0.094  --  0.39  0.39  0  0 
Poland  -- 0.008 --  0.06  0.05  0  1 
Portugal  -- 0.024  0.020  0.10  0.09  0  0 
Romania  -- --  0.002 0.31  0.26  0  1 
Russia  0.036 0.085 0.012  0.60  0.29  0  1 
Slovak Republic  -- 0.006 --  0.32  0.28  0  1 
Slovenia  0.006 0.007 0.003  0.09  0.08  0  1 
Sweden  -- 0.015  0.076  0.04  0.03  0  0 
Ukraine  -- --  0.043 0.36  0.22  0  1 
United States  0.120 0.159  --  0.45  0.43  0  0 
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Note to Table 3 
 
  Religious-conversion rates are computed, as described in the text, from International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1991 and 1998 and World Values Survey (WVS) 2001.  Sources 
of other variables are in the notes to Table 4.  The religious-pluralism variable in column 4 is 1-H, 
where H is the sum of squares of religion-adherence shares among persons who adhere to some 
religion.  This pluralism variable corresponds to the probability that a person meets a person with 
a different religion in a random encounter among persons with some religion.  The alternative 
pluralism variable in column 5 takes account of non-religion.  The formula is (1-H)/(1+n), 
where 1-H is the pluralism variable from column 4 and n is the ratio of persons with no religion 
to persons with some religion.  This alternative variable gives the probability that a person with 
some religion meets a person with a different religion in a random encounter among persons 
selected from the entire population.   37
 
Table 4  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
 regression  sample  overall  sample 
Variable  N mean  s.d.  N mean  s.d. 
Religious-conversion rate, ISSP 1991  13  0.045  0.033  -- -- -- 
Religious-conversion rate, ISSP 1998  29  0.050  0.050  -- -- -- 
Religious-conversion rate, WVS 2001  22  0.023  0.019  -- -- -- 
log(conversion rate, ISSP 1991)  13  -3.48  1.05  -- -- -- 
log(conversion rate, ISSP 1998)  29  -3.55  1.13  -- -- -- 
log(conversion rate, WVS 2001)  22  -4.20  1.06  -- -- -- 
Religious-pluralism indicator, 1970  40  0.27 0.19 192 0.32 0.22 
Alternative pluralism indicator, 1970  40  0.22 0.15 192 0.29 0.22 
Restrictions on conversion, 1990  40 0.25 -- 171  0.41 -- 
Log (per capita GDP), 1990  40  9.56 0.49 176 8.46 1.12 
Years of School Attainment, 1990  40  8.83 1.58 119 5.63 2.98 
Communist, 1970  40 0.35 -- 190  0.18 -- 
State religion, 1970  40 0.30 -- 189  0.39 -- 
Regulation of religion, 1970s  40 0.40 -- 171  0.34 -- 
Monthly church attendance, 1990, …  40 0.31  0.21 87 0.40  0.25 
Belief in hell, 1990, …  40 0.29  0.17 81 0.43  0.27 
Belief in heaven, 1990, …  40 0.47  0.22 81 0.59  0.27 
Belief in after-life, 1990, …  40 0.51  0.19 82 0.58  0.23 
Religious person, 1990, …  40 0.63  0.18 79 0.69  0.19 
Barrett religion shares, 1970:        
Catholic  40  0.433 0.397  192  0.309 0.365 
Protestant  40  0.323 0.355  192  0.216 0.291 
Orthodox  40  0.168 0.308  192  0.070 0.201 
Jewish  40  0.027 0.136  192  0.007 0.062 
Muslim  40  0.020 0.046  192  0.232 0.358 
Hindu  40  0.000 0.001  192  0.022 0.104 
Eastern Religion (including Buddhist)  40  0.025 0.153  192  0.067 0.214 
Other Religion  40  0.004 0.006  192  0.079 0.159 
Non-religion share of total population  40  0.123 0.148  192  0.074 0.155 
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Notes to Table 4 
 
  These variables are used in the regressions shown in Tables 5 and 6.  The sample 
of 40 countries comprises those, aside from East Germany (which is missing other data), 
with religious-conversion data.  Means are unweighted averages across the countries.  
The religion shares are fractions of the adhering population in each country.  The 
Protestant category includes Anglican, independent Christian churches, unaffiliated 
Christians, and “marginal Christians.” 
 
Sources:  Religious-conversion rates, shown in Table 3 and discussed in the text, are from 
ISSP 1991, ISSP 1998, and WVS 2001.  Religion-adherence shares among the adhering 
population and non-religion fractions are from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).  
Pluralism indicators are calculated from these shares, as described in the notes to Table 3 
and the text.  The dummy variable for restrictions on religious conversion (restrictions on 
proselytizing or inter-faith marriage) is from Fox and Sandler (2008).  Real per capita 
GDP is from Penn-World Tables version 6.2 (available online).  School attainment is 
from Barro and Lee (2001).  Dummy variables for Communism, state religion, and 
regulation of religion are from Barro and McCleary (2005).  Church-attendance rates (for 
monthly or greater attendance) and frequencies of religious beliefs and religiousness are 
from various waves of ISSP, WVS, and the Gallup Millennium Survey (see the text).   
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Table 5  Regressions for Logs of Religious-Conversion Rates 
(persons aged 30 and over, 40 countries, 3 survey waves) 
Independent variables  Coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








































State religion, 1970  -- -0.34 
(0.28) 
-- -- 
Regulation of religion, 1970s  -- 0.35 
(0.20) 
-- -- 
Monthly church attendance,  
   1990 … 
-- --  -0.52 
(0.71) 
-- 
Religious person, 1990 …  -- --  0.19 
(0.77) 
-- 
Muslim adherence share, 
   Barrett, 1970 
-- -- --  -4.0* 
(1.9) 

















*p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01 
 
Notes:  The system of three equations is for logs of religious-conversion rates from ISSP 
1991 (N=13), ISSP 1998 (N=29), and WVS 2001 (N=22).  40 countries appear at least 
once. Estimation is by the seemingly-unrelated (SUR) technique.  Separate constant 
terms, not shown, enter into each equation.  For the variables shown, the coefficients 
were constrained to be the same in each equation.  The religious-conversion rates are the 
ones in Table 3, columns 1-3.  The religious-pluralism variable is the one in Table 3, 
column 4. 
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Table 6  Regressions for Logs of Religious-Conversion Rates:  Robustness Checks 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 alternate  pluralism
variable 
conversion rate 





















































Notes:  Column (1) differs from Table 5, column 1, in the definition of the religious-
pluralism variable as the one in Table 3, column 5, rather than column 4.  Column (2) 
differs from Table 5, column 1, in the change of the dependent variable to calculate 
religious-conversion rates by treating all Other Christian as Protestant, rather than Other 
Religion.  Column (3) differs from Table 5, column 1, in the change of the dependent 
variable to calculate religious-conversion rates by omitting all conversions that involve 
the category Other Religion.  The flow ΔR then omits changes in which the origin or 
destination was Other Religion.  In this case, the denominator, the total of persons 
starting with some religious adherence, also omits persons categorized as Other Religion.   